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There is at present, considerable discussion concerning
the nature and merits of stock option plans as supplemental
means of compensation. One need only open a recent issue of
Business Week , Fortune , Duns Review , or any other business
oriented publication to realize that the stock option and
other forms of executive compensation are of vital interest
to the business community. This study is therefore an attempt
to evaluate the stock option as an attractive compensation
device in light of, and as affected by, federal tax legis-
lation during the past 20 years. The research question to
be answered is : How has federal tax legislation influenced
corporate and executive interest in stock options during ths
period 1950-1970?
Five subsidiary questions, keyed to Chapters I through
IV are as follows
:
1. What are stock options? What are their objectives,
and how do they fit into the executive compensation package?
(Chapter I).
2. What effect did federal tax legislation have on
the development of stock options during the 19 50 f s and mid-
1960 's? (Chapter I).

3. How great has been the impact of the 1969 Tax
Reform Act on stock option plan desirability for the indi-
vidual executive and for the corporation? (Chapter II).
4. How has tax legislation affected the entrepre-
neurial incentive value of stock options? (Chapter III).
5. What new stock option practices or related programs
have emerged in 1970 as a result of the 1969 Tax Reform Act?
(Chapter IV)
.
Why discuss stock options today? The use of stock
options in the corporate compensation package has received
wide publicity following enactment of the 19 69 Tax Reform Act.
Various provisions of the Act have a marked effect upon the
present and future attractiveness of the stock option. "It
is very pcssible that those in vogue today will be passe in
five years
.
By far, the greatest amount of material for this re-
search paper has been drawn from periodicals. Very few
recent books have been published on the subject of executive
compensation, let alone stock options. This is probably
attributed to the changing nature of executive compensation,
which may tend to discourage professional contributions
utilizing this medium. By contrast., business periodicals
keep the public and executives informed regarding the latest
trends and developments in executive compensation.
-'-Ephraim P. Smith, "Happenings in Executive Compen-
sation," Personnel Journal (May, 1970), p. 386.

CHAPTER I
THE STOCK OPTION AS PART OF THE EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION PACKAGE
The heavy progressive personal tax rates which have
been imposed in this country since World War II have encour-
aged corporations to seek out compensation arrangements for
their executives which either qualify for capital gains tax
treatment or which defer tax liabilities until the lower-
marginal-bracket retirement years. In the 19 50 ' s and 19 60 T s,
stock options were a particular form of reward in this con-
nection.
Perhaps no incentive has ccme under sharper scrutiny
in recent years than the stock option. Any discussion of
stock options is necessarily complicated by the variety of
stock ownership programs available for use within companies.
Statutory and nonstatutory stock options plans have been
used with varying degrees of effectiveness to meet compensation
and ownership objectives as defined or implied by management.
Effectiveness varies for many reasons. Some programs
have been Installed without giving much consideration to the
objectives the plan hopes to achieve. "A large Midwestern
manufacturer 5 for example, installed a qualified stock option

plan on top of a stock funded profit plan and a bonus plan
where part of the reward was deferred stock. The implied
purpose of the option plan was to promote ownership of stock
among key employees . . . an objective that the other two
plans had already achieved."
Stock Option defined
In essence, a stock option represents a corporation's
offer to sell a specific number of shares of its stock to an
executive at a stated price so long as he completes the purchase
within a given period. It is a form of contingent deferred
compensation—contingent because its value depends on what
happens to the price of the stock during that period; deferred
because the tax law imposes certain restrictions as to the
timing of exercise and the realization of any gains therefrom.
If the value of the stock decreases during the period, he
need not buy, hence losing nothing. Since the value of such
a plan lies in the future and is somewhat speculative, its
worth as pure compensation or immediate reward cannot be
readily determined, nor can it be related to current perform-
ance. This, however, is incidental, for in many instances
the primary purpose of stock options is to spur future
-•-Richard E. Wettling, "An Up-to-Date Look at Stock
Options and Their Use," Compensating Executive Worth , edited
by Russell F. Moore, American Management Association (New





performance rather than reward past deeds.
Management of Texas Instruments, Incorporated echoes
this purpose. "Although an individual's past performance
inevitably presents a basis for determining his probable
marked influence on TI ' s future performance, options are
used as an incentive for future individual performance and
are never used as a reward for past accomplishments."
The stock option may be said to serve a variety of
other purposes.
1. It helps a company create adequate executive
incentives and rewards. Today's tax rates, living costs and
expenses incident to executive office render it difficult,
if not impossible, for managers to accumulate a large estate
from savings out of current compensation.
2. In making it possible for an employee to acquire
a substantial stock interest, the stock option serves an
objective long sought by shareholders; giving management an
identity of interest with stockholders.
3. The stock option involves no corporate expenditures
of funds, and in fact, brings new funds into the business.
John R. Hyde, "The Total Management Compensation
Package," Compensating Executive Worth
,
edited by Russell F.
Moore, American Management Association (New York, Vail Ballou
Press, Inc., 1968), p. 245
P. E. Haggerty, "Incentives in Texas Instruments, Inc.,"
Incentives for Executives
,
edited by David W. Ewing and Dan
E~. Fenn^ Jr. (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962),
p. 156
.
V. Henry Rothschild, "Financing Stock Purchases by
Executives," Harvard Business Review (March-April, 19 57), p. Ml.

4. It provides a method for the smaller company, the
growth company, the company with leverage stock, and the
company unable to offer substantial cash rewards to compete
for executive talent with large established business.
Stock options are not without risk to the executive,
however, as market conditions of the past few years will
attest. For in accepting them, he is gambling that he will
profit more on the stock than by taking straight salary.
Working for him in this expectation is the privilege, in-
herent in the deferred nature of the transaction, of having
some of the income taxed as a capital gain, an especially
important consideration for executives in the upper income
brackets
.
For the corporation, stock option programs offer the
attractive opportunity to provide substantial levels of
compensation without a direct outflow of corporate funds,
especially when authorized but unissued stock is used.
Certain newer companies with limited capital but good potential
have even been able to attract entrepreneurial-minded exec-
utives from larger firms. A classical example occurred some
years ago when a computer firm (Honeywell, Incorporated) was
set up. With little ready cash, but with sound ideas, the
nucleus of managers and specialists which was attracted to
the firm succeeded in building a going computer business and
Smith, Personnel Journal, pp. 386-391.

in using its stock option program to make themselves inde-
7pently wealthy. Such programs also have the advantage
that the option can be awarded to employees under conditions
named by the corporation. Qualified stock options, for
example, obliging the executive to hold the stock three to
five years in order to obtain a capital gain, tie him to
the company.
Stock options, in contrast to most other incentive
programs, are designed to give executives a stake in the
growth potential of the stock, and, as a special committee
found in reviewing the General Motors option plan, thereby
stimulate them to maximize their contribution to the long-
o
term success of the organization. In some instances, it
must be admitted, corporate earnings may increase substan-
tially without resulting in any corresponding rise in the
market value of the stock. And in times of a declining
stock market, of course, options lose much of their incentive
or attraction value. Nevertheless, in 1969, 394 of the
"Fortune 500" companies offered their executives a stock
q
option program.
Findings in large firms
With some exceptions, larger options are granted to






q Smith, Personnel Journal, p. 39 0.

8those who occupy the upper rungs of a company's organizational
ladder. In addition to having a more direct effect on the
company's long term success, these executives usually have
more income with which to exercise their options. In a
recent study by the American Management Association's Exec-
utive Compensation Service of the relationship between total
purchase price of options held by 200 top-ranking executives
and their annual total compensation, the number of years'
compensation represented by the purchase price was as follows
:
Number of Years ' Percentage of
Compensation Executives
Less than 1 11
1 but less than 2 28
2 but less than 3 23
3 but less than 5 19
5 but less than 10 13
10 but less than 15 4
15 but less than 20 2 10
Thus it would appear that for top executives, an option
grant with a value equal to one to five times their annual
compensation is not unusual.
Since 19 50, the restricted stock option has become a
popular method of compensating the corporate executive.
While stock options and stock purchase plans have been
in existence since the early part of the century, they
10Wettling, Compensating Executive Worth, p. 143.

were not widely used until changes in the Federal Income
Tax. Law made possible increased benefits from such plans. -*-
Before 19 50, the employee exercising stock options was taxed
at ordinary income rates on the difference between the market
price and the option price on the date of exercise. "This
tax treatment afforded options little added attraction compared
to salaries paid in cash."
The tax law of 19 50 liberalized the treatment of stock
options and made them much more attractive as a means of
compensation. Under this law, no taxable income is realized
by the employee until the time of exercise of a restricted
stock option. Income results only if the stock is later sold
at a higher price. The attractiveness was further enhanced
by the provision that if the stock thus acquired is held for
a specific length of time, any gain resulting from the sale
is subject to capital gains tax only. The popularity of such
compensation plans is evidenced by the fact that, "while only
13.7 percent of the firms surveyed in 19 50 by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants , for its Accounting
Trends and Techniques
,
utilized such plans, this percentage
13had increased to 75 percent in 19 62."
To determine the prevalence of the stock option plan,
a base year of 1965 was selected for analysis, since by 1965,
George C. Holdren, "Stock Options and Management









not only were companies utilizing restricted stock options,
but the qualified stock options brought about by the 196*4
Tax Reform Act were also in use. In a report issued by the
National Industrial Conference Board, Incorporated of the
1965 compensation of the three. highest paid executives in
each of 1,304 corporations, a fairly detailed picture of the
level of stock option use in six major sectors of our private
economy was disclosed.
1. Manufacturing . Almost three fourths (559) of the
manufacturers with securities on the New York Stock Exchange
had a stock option plan in 1965. These options were somewhat
1
5
more common among the largest companies, as shown below.
Percent of Companies
Company Sales with Stock Options
$150 million and over 82%
$50 - $149 million 73%
$25 - $49 million 66%
Under $25 million 57%
Total 74%
2. Retail Trade . Almost three out of four (44) retail
firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange had a stock option
plan. Only 57 percent of the companies with sales under $100
14Harland Fox, "Top Executive Compensation," 1966







million had a plan compared with 8 percent of the larger
retailers
.
3. Gas and Electric Utilities , Almost one quarter
(27) of the utilities had a stock option plan. Only 16 per-
cent of the companies with operating revenue of $100 million
or more had a plan compared with 31 percent of the utilities
with operating revenue under $100 million.
4. Commercial Banking . Almost one quarter (40) of
the banks had a stock option plan. Forty-five percent of
the banks with deposits of $1 billion or more had a plan,
compared with 3 6 percent of the banks with deposits of
$500-$999 million and 10 percent with deposits under $500
million.
^
5. Life Insurance . Twenty-eight percent (31) of
the stock companies had a stock option plan (none of the
mutuals , of course). Like utilities, but unlike the majority
of most businesses, these plans were more common in smaller
companies than larger companies. For example, 43 percent of
the companies with premium income under $10 million had a
plan, compared with 24 percent of the companies with premium
income of $10-$49 million and 15 percent of companies with
...
. i q$50 million or more income.
16 Ibid




. , p. 61.
19 Ibid
. , p. 66.
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6. Fire, Marine, and Casualty Insurance . Thirty
percent (11) of the stock companies had an option plan (and
none of the mutuals). Eight of the 10 companies with
premium income of $20 million or more had a plan, compared
with three of the 47 companies with less premium income.™
Arch Patton said in 19 66,
The loud wails that accompanied Congress's 19 64 changes
in ground rules governing options would have led one to
believe that this device had lost all its attraction.
The facts indicate otherwise. The 50 5 companies surveyed
reported 340 option plans in 1965, versus 351 a year
earlier, a dip of barely 3%. This means that the number
of companies with such plans slipped from 69% of the total
in 19 64 to 67% last year--hardly a drop that indicates
a devastating loss of confidence.
More importantly, perhaps, new option plans filed with
the New York Stock Exchange increased nearly one-third;
from 107 in 19 64 to 140 in 1965. When amended plans were
added to new plans, corporate actions on stock options
in 1915 topped those of 1964 by a thumping 44 percent.' ^-
Gains fron. Stock Options
One of the more interesting sets of statistics on gains
from stock options is developed by Sibson and Company in their
Annual Compensation Survey. In 1970, this survey included a
detailed analysis of the paper profit made through exercise
of stock options by the top three executives in 150 companies
from 19 6 5 through 19 69. 22 See Exhibit I.
20 Ibid.
, pp. 71-72.
21Arch Patton, "Top Executive Pay: New Facts and
Figures," Harvard Business Review (September-October, 1966),
p. 97.
2 Robert E. Sibson, "Executive Pay: A Time of Dramatic




















$250 $380 $490 $730
230 350 460 695
.210 315 430 660
19 280 400 630
170 250 370 595
150 215 3 40 560
130 180 305 530
110 145 275 495
90 110 240 460
70 80 210 425
50 45 180 395
Aside from establishing a norm for capital income com-
pensation in this period, the survey spotlights the influence
of both company growth rate and company size on capital income
compensation. During the years of bullish stock prices (1965 -
1969), price earnings multiples of rapidly growing companies
tended to be higher than those of their more stable counterparts
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Thus, stock prices, and stock option gains, were driven up
much more rapidly in the faster growing companies.
Furthermore, the top executives in smaller, rapid
growth companies have tended to have almost artificially
low salaries and bonuses, but large option grants. These
companies require highly capable executives but many cannot
afford high cash compensation.
Options and federal legislation
Stock option plans appeared in federal legislation
with the Revenue Act of 19 50, which defined a class of re-
stricted stock options. The Revenue Act of 19 54 stipulated
that plans meeting certain requirements , concerning such
items as timing and limitation of amounts held, could enable
an executive to report as a capital gain the difference
between the option price and the fair market value at the
time when he sold his stock. The Act did not permit any tax
deduction by the company on the transaction.
The Tax Reform Act of 1964, which defined a new
qualified class of stock options, substantially tightened
the requirements : the option price must be at least the
fair market value of the stock on the date of grant, not 9 5
percent of it; the option must be exercised within five
years, not ten, if at all; to qualify for capital gains tax
treatment, the participant must hold his stock at least three

15
years, not two; this requirement has severely hampered the
average executive's efforts to finance his purchase through
normal bank channels. Since then, nonstatutory plans,
meaning those which do not meet the specifications of the
Internal Revenue Code, including bargain stock plans, options
to independent contractors, and options to employees by
stockholders, have become more popular. Although they lack
some tax advantages of statutory plans, the time when the
taxation will occur-~the time of exercise or some future
time--can be controlled by the terms of the plan, and at
that time, the company is entitled to a tax deduction.
Option plans have not been without opposition. Douglas
Dillon, speaking as the Secretary of the Treasury during
hearings before the Senate Finance Committee, said of the
stock option: "We think that it is a wrong system, and we
24think, basically, it has no place ... in our tax laws."
Other critics have been equally forceful. The AFL-CIO has
charged, "They have left a trail marked by special privilege,
hypocrisy, tax avoidance, inflationary pressure and stock
9 R
market abuse." Also numbered among the opponents we find




Statement of the Secretary of the Treasury Douglas
Dillon , Hearing Before Senate Committee on Finance , Part 1,
87th Congress, 1st Session (Washington Government Printing
Office, 1952), p. 459.
The Stock Option Scandal , Industrial Union Depart-
ment, AFL-CIO (Washington, D.C., 1959), p. 4.

16
such diverse citizens as Thomas Watson, Jr., of International
Business Machines, Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of New
York, Senator Albert M. Gore of Tennessee, and Dean Irwin N.
Griswold of the Harvard Law School. Basically, these
critics felt that a stock option provides an executive with
a free stock market ride without any risk. If the stock
goes up in price, the executive, upon purchasing his option,
will have a bargain purchase. As bargain purchases from an
employer are normally considered income-taxable at normal
rates, these critics declared, the logical question is why
options receive preferential tax treatment.
Options have also been challenged on the basis of their
excessive cost to the company. On the day a statutory option
is exercised by the executive, the company could sell the
stock in the open market for its fair market value. The cost
to the company is therefore the spread between the price of
the stock on the date of grant and its fair market value on
the date of exercise for which the company has received no
tax deduction.
On the other hand, Henry Ford, II, has credited stock
options with being "one of the most efficient and effective
methods for rewarding the corporate . executive . . . one man-
27ifestly fair to all parties concerned." The Congress of
26Daniel M. Holland and Wilbur G. Lewellen, "Probing
the Record of Stock Options," Harvard Business Review (March-
April, 19 6 2), p. 54.
27Henry Ford, II, "Stock Options are in the Public
Interest," Harvard Business Review (July-August, 1961), p. 45
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the United States has also given recognition to the need for
a law that would provide incentive under high income taxes
for those who are willing to risk either their capital or
their management reputations and careers. The Senate Finance
Committee, in approving the capital-gains provision of the
Internal Revenue Code, defined the stock option purpose in
these words:
Employee stock options are frequently used as incentive
devices by corporations who wish to attract new manage-
ment, to convert their officers into partners by giving
them a stake in the business, to retain the services of
executives who might otherwise leave or to give to their
employees generally a more direct interest in the success
of the corporation. 2 8
Critics, however, contend that even though condoned by the
Congress, the stock option is morally wrong for any or all
of the fo3 lowing reasons
:
1. It is discriminatory and inequitable in application.
2. It is structured and administered by the few who
derive the benefit
.
3. It does not serve the intended purpose.
In a number of instances, shareholders have attacked
compensation by stock option as unreasonable. They have been
almost uniformly unsuccessful. The courts may agree with the
plaintiff-shareholder that an increase in the market price of
the stock from the date of grant to the date when the option
price is exercised is not indicative of the value of an
28Thomas M. Ware, "The Value of Stock Options," In-
centives for Executives, edited by David W. Ewing and Dan H.
Fehn^ Jr
.
5 (New York, HcGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 19 62),
p. 98.
29 Ibid., p. 99.
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executive f s services. However, they are not willing to
measure the amount of compensation by the after-grant in-
crease in the stock's market value. Rather, the judicial
attitude seems to be that if the option arrangement is
reasonable when adopted, the fact that, in hindsight, it may
seem generous, is irrelevant. The stock option appears now
to be accepted, and generally, beyond serious challenge
from a legal point of view if the law of the state of incor-
poration concerning issuance of options is carefully fol-
lowed. 30
Restricted versus qualified options
The 19 54 Revenue Act established a set of conditions
which must be met if an option is to be classified as re-
stricted. The major requirements may be summarized as follows
1. The option price must be at least 85 percent of
the fair market value of the stock on the day of grant.
2. By its terms, the option cannot be exercised after
ten years from the date of grant.
3. With the exception of a special 110 percent pricing
rule, no options can be granted to an executive who owns more
than 10 percent of the total voting power or value of the
corporation.
4. The option, by its terms, is exercisable only by
30Walter S. Rothschild, "Legal Problems of Executive
Compensation," Compensating Executive Worth, edited by Russell
F. Moore, American Management Association, Inc. (New York,
Vail Ballou Press, Inc., 1968), pp. 195-196.
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the employee or, in the event of his death, by his bene-
ricianes or estate.
With certain exceptions, according to Section 4 21 of
the 19 54 Act, if the recipient of a restricted stock option
does not sell the stock for two years after the date of
exercise, he will receive preferential tax treatment. Any
profit he realizes on the transaction above the fair market
value of the stock on the date of grant will be taxed as a
capital gain.
The 19 64 Tax Reform Act created two new categories of
stock option plans to replace the restricted stock option,
"which has been the basic framework for stock options granted
to top executives and other key employees since 1950. One
of the new stock option types was the qualified stock option
which applies if a company grants options only to key em-
3 2ployees .
"
Here follow the key factors which must be taken into
consideration in structuring a qualified stock option plan
to meet the requirements of the 19 64 Tax Reform Act.
1. The plan requires stockholder approval. Although
stockholder approval was not a requirement for options prior
Wettling, Compensating Executive Worth
,
pp. 130-131.
The other type is the employee stock purchase plan
which the company would use if it were willing to grant options
to essentially all employees. See "Employee Stock Purchase
Plans," The Conference Board Record (September, 1966), p. 23.
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to 19 64, most companies did present their plans to stock-
holders. In this instance, the 19 64 Tax Reform Act merely
formalized existing practice.
2. Options must be granted within ten years. Options
to purchase shares authorized under the plan must be granted
within ten years from the date when the plan is adopted or
the date when it is approved by the stockholders, whichever
occurs first.
3. Options must be exercised within five years. This
restriction, combined with the requirement that options must
be granted within 10 years, places a maximum life on any one
option program of 15 years.
4. The holder of the option must be an employee. This
restricticn prevents the use of qualified stock options as a
device to compensate independent contractors
.
5. The amount of stock already held is limited.
Generally, no stock option can be granted to an executive if
he possesses more than five percent of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock issued by the corporation
6. Shares must be held for three years. Under the
1964 amendments, the holder of the option must not sell or
transfer his shares for a three-year period beginning the day
after the date of transfer following his exercising the option
7. Old options must be exercised first. This re-
quirement precludes the possibility of an executive's
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exercising only his newer options in the event the per-share
value of his company's stock has fallen and he has older,
higher-prices options still outstanding.
The qualified stock option is different in many re-
spects from the restricted stock option, but the two most
important differences are these: (1) Under the qualified
plan, the executive must hold the stock at least three years
in order to get the full capital gains; under the restricted
stock option plan, he had to hold the stock only six months
after the purchase and only two years after the grant of the
option; (2) Under the qualified plan, an executive has only
five years after the date of grant to exercise an option:
33
under the restricted stock option, he had ten years.
The 19 64 Tax Reform Act had the effect of "freezing"
the further use of restricted stoc <c options and substituting
qualified options and stock purchase plans in their place.
Nonstatutory options
During the 19 50 T s, restricted stock option plans came
into their own, and by the early 1960's approximately two-
thirds of all listed corporations had some sort of stock
option program. In the mid-1960 T s, the additional restrictions
imposed on statutory options by the 19 64 Tax Reform Act
focused attention by many companies and consultants on
33Harland Fox, 19 66 National Industrial Conference





nonstatutory stock option programs.
A nonstatutory option includes any type of compensation
which fails to meet the requirements of a qualified plan.
As an example, a nonstatutory plan can be structured so that
the option period can extend beyond five years, the stock is
offered at less than its fair market value, or the three year
holding period need not apply.
Although nonstatutory option plans offer a company
considerably more flexibility in plan design, they do present
a different series of tax considerations and problems. De-
pending on how a plan is structured, the participant will
generally incur an income tax liability as compensation received
either at the time of the option grant, in the year when he
exercises the option, or sometime in the future. The company
will receive a corresponding deduction. However, after this
tax has been paid, the basis of the shares will be adjusted,
and any further gain in an arm's length sale or transfer will
be taxed as capital gains
.
The recent interest in nonstatutory stock options has
centered around plans in which the options do not have a
readily ascertainable fair market value at the time of grant.
Plans of this kind can be structured to provide an effective
estate-building program, a partly tax sheltered form of com-
pensation, or a combination of both. Through restrictions
Wettling, Compensating Executive Worth, pp. 130-131

23
imposed on the participant, taxation of the options as com-
pensation can be controlled to occur at the time they are
exercised or sometime in the future.
Summary
Stock options are a form of supplemental compensation
which came into wide use in corporate executive pay packages
following passage of the 19 50 Revenue Act. The stock option
became a very popular incentive for the executive primarily
because of the favorable tax advantages it afforded. It is
designed as a long-term incentive and is normally offered to
executives in high decision-making positions in the enterprise.
An option grant of five times annual salary is not unusual.
Executive gains from stock options have been very impressive,
particularly in the faster growing industries.
The stock option also provided an attractive opportunity
for the corporation to offer executives substantial levels
of compensation without a direct outflow of corporate funds.
As a result, although stock option programs are found in most
major corporations, they are primarily found in the larger,
high-revenue companies of the manufacturing and retail-trade
industries
.
The first legal recognition of options was given to
the restricted stock option by the 19 50 Revenue Act. Further
requirements were imposed by the 19 54 Revenue Act. The
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qualified stock option was an outgrowth of the 19 64 Tax Re-
form Act, and this option virtually replaced the restricted
stock option as a prime motivator within most large cor-
porations .
Option plans have had considerable opposition, par-
ticularly in the 19 50's and early 19 60's, mainly for their
having preferential tax treatment and for the excessive
costs experienced by the companies in administering the stock
option program. Much criticism results from shareholders
and public officials, who claim this form of compensation is
unreasonable, discriminatory and inequitable in application.
However, Congress has taken a very definite stand in support
of the stock option by asserting that the top executive in
the organization who is willing to risk capital, reputation
and career, is entitled to some form of tax relief; the tax




STOCK OPTIONS AND THE 19 6 9 TAX REFORM ACT
Provisions of the Act
Much of the problem of the appeal of a stock option
plan evolves from the Tax Reform Act of 19 6 9 which has re-
duced the attractiveness of both the restricted stock option
and the qualified stock option.
The Tax Reform Act is turning out to be a nightmare for
both executives and for the companies they manage. It
deals some devastating blows to certain forms of compen-
sation that have been widely credited with attracting
and motivating executives.
In the year since the Act was passed by Congress, many com-
panies have been altering their management compensation plans
to avoid the brunt of these blows. There is no question that
executives, particularly those in the highest levels, will
be hurt by the new tax rules , and there is no telling what
effect the changes in the tax law will have on the quality of
business leadership.
Shortly after the passage of the act, considerable
enthusiasm was expressed regarding the "corporate executive's
tax law. This misguided enthusiasm was excusable, since the
act is very large and quite complicated and the full implications
Arthur M. Louis, "Hidden Jokers in the New Tax Deck,"




of its many provisions could not be grasped at once." 2 Now,
one year later, the Tax Reform Act seems destined to provoke
a major revolution in executive compensation.
Changes that affect stock options
Because this thesis is devoted to stock option analysis
it seems appropriate to discuss the impact that changes re-
sulting from this tax law will have on a typical corporate
executive who occupies a top management position where part
of his compensation is in the form of stock options.
Earned income . --The most common form of managerial earned
income is cash salary, paid during or shortly after the year
in which it is earned. There are several other types of
executive compensation that are also considered earned income.
For example: (1) cash or stock bonuses, if they are paid
within a year after they are earned; in the case of stock, the
tax would be assessed on the market value at the time the
executives took possession; (2) cash or stock paid in install-
ments over a period of years, if each payment occurs within
a year after the executives' right to it is no longer subject
to a substantial risk or forfeiture; (3) cash or stock bonuses
that become vested within a year before being distributed in
a lump sum.
The earned income maximum can save a highly paid exec-






regulations provided his return isn't cluttered with a lot of
tax preference income as well. Suppose, for example, Exec-
utive Jones reports taxable income of $150,000 on a joint
return and that he has no other income. During 1970, he would
be in the 66 percent tax bracket, and his total tax bill would
amount to $76,980. In 1971, the maximum rate on earned income
is scheduled to decline to 60 percent. Since part of the
executive's income, the top 50 percent to be exact, had pre-
viously been taxed at more than 60 percent, he would pay a
lower tax in 1971; the tax on that top $50,000 would drop from
$31,800 under the old law to a flat 60 percent or $30,000,
during 1971, for a savings of $1,800. In 1972, when the 50
percent maximum rate is supposed to take effect, the top
$98,000 oi Executive Jones's income, previously taxed at more
than 50 percent, would be subject to reduced rates: the levy
on the top $98,000 would decline from $58,920 to $49,000.
This would bring the tax bill down to $67,060, or $9,920 less
than he paid under the old law .
Tax preference items . --The tax preference provision of the new
act imposes a ten percent penalty tax on certain favored forms
of income. Congress set up a double exclusion, to spare both
those taxpayers who have only modest amounts of tax preference
income, and those who pay substantial taxes despite their tax
preference income. In determining how much of his tax preference
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income is subject to the penalty tax, an individual is en-
titled to exclude the sum of $30,000 plus the amount that his
income tax would be if there were no tax preference items.
Tax preference items are of considerable concern to
the participants in a stock option program, particularly
where qualified stock options are concerned. The difference
between the exercise price and the market value of a qualified
stock at the time it is purchased is considered a tax pre-
ference item, and so is one-half of any net long-term capital
gain. To illustrate, suppose the same Executive Jones decides,
during 1972 , to exercise an option to buy 13,000 shares of
his company's stock at a price of $15 per share, at a time
when the share has a market value of $25. The $13 0,0 00
difference between the total purchase price and the market
value of the stock would be considered tax preference income.
After allowing for the $30,000 exclusion, plus an exclusion
equal to his $67,060 in regular taxes, he would still have to
pay a penalty tax on $32,294. The outcome would be similar
if, instead of exercising stock options that year, he were
to sell previously acquired stock at a fat capital gain.
But the tax picture for Executive Jones is not complete,
since tax preference income can offset the amount of earned
income subject to the new maximum rate. The taxpayer is
allowed an exclusion here too, but it is limited to a flat
$30,000. Even after this exclusion, Executive Jones still
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would be required to reduce by $100,000 the amount of his
earned income qualifying for the 50 percent maximum. however,
only $98,000 of his earned income was subject to tax rates
exceeding 50 percent under the old law. The $100,000 in tax
preference income remaining after exclusions would be more
than enough to offset the $9 8,00 0; thus the tax preference
income would push Executive Jones's tax back up to $76,980
from $67,060 precisely where it stood under the old law.
By merely exercising his stock option, he would have incurred
$13,21 14 in additional taxes
,
including the penalty tax
($76,980 - $67,060 + the 10 percent penalty tax of $3,294).
Additionally, there is no guarantee that the stock will
appreciate.
Capital Gains . --The Tax Reform Act of 19 69 has increased
capital gains taxes for the highly paid executive. Under the
old tax law, only half of net long-term capital gains was
taxable, and the maximum levy on this portion was 50 percent;
or to put it another way, the total net gain was subject to
a maximum rate of 25 percent. Now, only the first $50,000 of
long-term net capital gains qualifies for the 25 percent
maximum. Anything beyond that will be taxed up to 29 1/2
percent in 1970, up to 32 1/2 percent in 1971, and up to 35
percent starting in 1972. With straight salary scheduled to
be taxed at a maximum of 50 percent, plus the penalty tax of
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10 percent, many executives may find the advantages of capital
gains too small to make the extra risks worthwhile. Under
a qualified stock option plan, for example, the stock must
be held for three years after exercise to qualify for capital
gains treatment; in the meantime, the stock could plunge.
Returning to Executive Jones with $150,000 of taxable
earned income; suppose his only other income consists of
$300,000 in net long-term capital gains. Prior to the 1969
Tax Reform Act, his tax on earned income was $7 6,9 80, while
his tax on capital gains would have been at the old maximum
rate of 25 percent, or $7 5,000; his total tax bill would have
come to $151,980.
After the Act became law, the computation becomes much
more complicated and the tax rises sharply. As previously
shown, the top $98,000 of Executive Jones's earned income
would come under the 50 percent maximum starting in 197 2,
causing his tax on earned income to decline to $67,060. How-
ever, since there is capital gains income, one half of it is
treated as a tax preference item. Even after allowing for the
$30,000 exclusion, this would be more than enough to eliminate
any benefit Executive Jones might have received from the
earned income maximum. His tax on the earned income would
come to $7 6,980, which is where it would have stood under the
old law. In addition, after allowing for an exclusion of
$97,060 (ie., $30,000 + $67,060 in tax that would have been
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paid if there were no tax preference income), there remains
$52,940 subject to the ten percent penalty tax; the penalty
tax increased the tax bill by $5,29*4 .
Finally, Executive Jones has to determine the tax
remaining on his capital gains. The first $50,000 of capital
gains would be taxed at the old maximum rate of 2 5 percent
so the payment on this portion would be $12,500. The $250,000
which is the difference between the stated capital gains
of $300,000 and the $50,000 subject to the 25 percent rate,
would be taxed at rates up to 3 5 percent, and thus the total
tax on $300,000 would be $87,500.
Therefore , after all computations are taken into con-
sideration, it is possible to determine the total tax, based
on the giv sn assumptions for Executive Jones. The total tax
bill which considers payments on earned income, the penalty
tax, and the capital gains tax, would amount to $181,974
,
which is $29,994 more than Executive Jones would have paid
3
under the old law .
The above analysis conclusively proves a point; the
top executive in American industry finds himself in a less
favorable tax position as a result of the 1969 Tax Reform Act
than he formerly was. A comparison with other forms of com-
pensation is presented later in this Chapter. The total
This author is very grateful for the assistance ren-
dered by Walter T. Windle, tax consultant to the Goodall Rubber
Company, in helping to analyze the provisions of the 1969
Tax Reform Act and for verifying the correctness of the tax
calculations for "Executive Jones."
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compensation received by Executive Jones is not unrealistic
in today's economy. The firm of Sibson and Company devel-
oped, in 1970, a management compensation study which covered
salaries of chief executive officers in 650 industrial com-
panies which reflected the reasonableness of the figures
utilized to compute Executive Jones's taxes.
The figures take on added significance when they
become large enough to reduce the earned income sheltered
by the 5 percent maximum tax, thus showing more of that in
the 197 0, 7 percent tax bracket. What happens is that the
higher the paper gain from exercising stock options, the
bigger the tax bill on salary and bonuses. "Robert Sibson
tells of one chief executive who, as the result of merely
exercising options, faced a total tax equal to 10 1! percent
5
of his normal salary and bonus."
Perhaps the most confusing aspect of the 1969 Tax
Reform Act is that for the first time each of the elements
affects the other. It is impossible to analyze the elements
of executive compensation one at a time as was formerly
possible.
The Act and restricted options
Most aspects of the stock option program have been
treated thus far from the standpoint of the 19 69 Tax Reform
^Robert E. Sibson, "Executive Pay: A Time of Dramatic






Act with the exception of one: the restricted stock option.
The main element of a restricted stock plan is an
agreement by the employer corporation to either sell at a
substantial discount or to give outright a specified number
of shares of the common stock of the firm to certain of its
employees. In the absence of any restriction on the em-
ployee's right to resell the shares, the difference between
their market value at the time of the transaction and the
price, if any, paid for them would be taxed immediately as
ordinary income.
Since restrictions are placed on resale, however--for
example, the recipient may be prohibited from disposing
of the stock for a period of five years on penalty of
having to return the shares to his employer—and since
tax administrative practices hold that such constraints
preclude effective realization of the value of the
securities by their nominal owner, no federal income
tax is levied until the restrictions lapse.
At that point, the employee is assessed a personal tax, and
the corporation is permitted a corresponding deduction from
its own income.
Holders of restricted stock options, under the new
law, will find themselves in a terrific quandary. They must
decide within 30 days after the stock is transferred whether
they will pay a tax at once, based on the market value at
George W. Hettenhouse and Wilbur G. Lewellen, "The
Taxation of Restricted Stock Compensation Plans," National
Tax Journal , Vol. XXII, No. 3 (September, 1969), p. 368.
7 V. H. Rothschild and J. B. Salwen, "The Restricted
Stock Plan Arrangement: A Practical Analysis of its Current
Use," Journal of Taxation (June, 1968), p. 239.
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the time they got the stock, or whether they will wait until
the restrictions lapse and pay a tax based on the market
value at that time. While the maximum tax rate on earned
income will apply to restricted stock, this benefit is more
than offset by the fundamental
• change in the way the stock is
taxed. If the executive is optimistic about the company's
prospects, he has to assume that the stock will rise in value
by the time the restrictions lapse; were that the only con-
sideration, he would almost certainly decide to pay his tax
at the time he received the stock. However, if he pays the
tax at that time, and later forfeits the stock, his payment
will not be refunded. And even if the executive does not
forfeit, he would be outsmarted if he decided to pay the tax
at the outset and the stock then proceeded to decline in value;
by waiting until the end of the restriction period, he would
have been subject to a smaller tax payment. All of which
sounds like a good argument for waiting until restrictions
lapse before paying the tax—except that by then, the stock
may have skyrocketed leaving the executive with an extra large
tax bill. 8
If the executive gets full rights to the restricted
stock and later sells it, he will be taxed at capital gains
rates on the difference between the selling price and the







similar to the tax treatment under the old law, which had
executives paying capital-gains taxes on the difference
between the selling price and the value that was taxed
initially.
"It appears that the restricted stock option will be
the chief casualty of the act ... in the next year or two,
almost all
. . . restricted stock option plans will vanish." 9
Thus, it can be said that corporate advisors have a
new goal; that of shifting compensation into the more advan-
tageous ."earned income" category and minimizing top executive
tax preference items.
The Act and investment interest
There is another provision in the Act which also affects
the executive who is partially compensated by stock options
and that provision covers investment interest. Virtually all
executives who exercise stock options borrow part of the
money which they sink into the investment. Interest paid to
finance a stock purchase traditionally has been deductible in
full on an individual's tax return. But, in 197 2, the Tax
Reform Act limits the amount of the investment interest that
may be deducted in calculating one's tax bill. In the meantime
investment interest will be treated as tax preference items
subject to the 10 percent penalty tax and may also have to be
offset against the amount of the earned income qualifying for
9 Ibid., p. 100.
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the maximum tax rate. Starting in 197 2, investment interest
will no longer be considered a tax preference.
This provision is not of interest to the average
investor, but to the top executive with large holdings, it
is a very important factor. For example, in a joint return
the flat sum of $25,000 in investment interest continues to
be deductible; the figure is $12,500 for separate returns.
This means that if an executive is paying 8 1/2 percent
interest annually on an investment debt as large as $294,117,
he can automatically continue to deduct the full amount of
interest (8 1/2 percent of $294,117 equals $25,000). In
addition, he can deduct an amount of investment interest equal
to the sum of his net investment income (such as dividends)
and his net long-term capital gains. Finally, if the exec-
utive's investment interest exceeds the sum of $25,000 plus
the net investment income plus the net long-term capital
gains, he still can deduct an amount equal to one half the
excess
.
"By establishing a direct relationship between dividends
and deductions, Congress was trying to encourage investments
that provide immediate income . . . and therefore immediate
tilOtax revenues.
A cost-benefit analysis
Drawing on the provisions of the 1969 Tax Reform Act,
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this writer has developed a cost-benefit analysis for various
types of executive compensation elements. The intent was
to ultimately rank the different stock options in relation
to other elements of the pay package.
In analyzing the present situation, the following
general conclusion has been reached: stock options are
quite inefficient in a monetary sense. Although they re-
ceived favorable tax treatment under the old law of marginal
tax rates, stock options are inferior to current cash com-
pensation in all but the very highest income classes. The
Tax Reform Act provides lower marginal tax rates on earned
income, and this reduction has decreased the efficiency of
stock options in the pay package.
To simplify this discussion, attention is directed
to the comparative cost of rewarding several "typical" exec-
utives in a "typical" large corporation. What is a "typicaL"
executive? Usually the age and income level are the most
important determinants of the cost structure. Considered
here will be a 50 year old executive in four income classes;
$20,000, $50,000, $100,000, and $150,000. The consolidated
assumptions in four executive profiles, one for each income
class, are shown in Exhibit II. The typical executive has
currently taxable income from investments or previously
A similar analysis was developed by George Hettenhouse
and Wilbur G. Lewellen which reflected taxation prior to the
19 6 9 Tax Reform Act. See Wilbur G. Lewellen and George W.
Hettenhouse, "Taxation of Compensation," The Journal of Tax-
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deferred income (or both) that amounts to 2 5 percent of his
current compensation income. Additionally, the typical exec-
utive generates tax deductions and exemptions comparable to
other men in his income class. 12 At retirement age of 65,
the executive has earned a pension equal to 40 percent of his
career-average salary. At death, he leaves a gross estate
equal to ten times his total pre-tax annual income, which is
then taxed accordingly. Finally, it is assumed that he con-
siders deferred benefits (pension plans and stock options) as
relatively low-risk sources of income. Stock options intro-
duce the most uncertainty into the current valuation of the
pay package, and consequently, have been discounted at a
rate appropriate for an equity investment.
A "typical" company applies to the larger, publicly-
owned company that is listed on one of the major stock ex-
changes. It is assumed that the company makes a profit each
year and is taxed at the marginal rate of 48 percent.
What is the value of the reward an executive receives
from a particular compensation device? In calculation of the
reward, two steps were followed. First, the elements of a
pay plan that accrue to an executive as a direct result of
his employment were determined. For example, the value of a
stock option is limited to its potential for purchasing stock
at a price under the then-current market price. Dividends and
1 9 Internal Revenue Service statistics of income data
for married taxpayers filing joint returns, 19 69.
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price appreciation realized by the executive after exercise
of the option, on the other hand, are available to any in-
vestor purchasing a like number of shares on the exercise
date and hence do not count as compensation to an executive.
Second, all the different elements were put on a comparable
basis. In other words, the differences resulting from dis-
similar tax treatment and time of receipt were accounted for
by recasting all quantities in terms of their after-tax
present values.
Once the reward was determined, the cost was easy to
find
.
The costs include items that are not identified as costs
in the accounting sense. For example, options and bar-
gain sales of stock are not accounted for as deductible
compensation; but realistically speaking, such trans-
actions nonetheless represent a company cost, since they
dilute the collective wealth of the company's owners.
Once all such elements of the cost were determined, they were
placed on a comparable basis by computing their after-tax
present values to the corporation.
To summarize, then, the procedure boils down to finding,
the after-tax, present value cost to the company of providing
a given after-tax, present value benefit to the executive. By
repeating this procedure for each element of pay, one can
identify both the relative costs of providing a given reward
and the relative rewards possible for a given cost.




By way of illustration, suppose that an executive who
is currently 5 5 years old is granted a deferred pay contract
that provides for a lump sum payment of $1,000 in the year
following his retirement at 65. The contract also provides
that in the event of his death, this payment will be made to
his beneficiary on the date originally stipulated. The
executive is likely to be in a 30 percent marginal tax bracket
after retirement and his beneficiary is likely to be taxed
at a 2 5 percent marginal rate. Mortality tables show that
the probability of a 55-year-old male surviving for 10 years
is roughly .86. The net after-tax payment, therefore, will
amount to $700 if paid to the executive and $7 50 if paid to
his beneficiary. The expected payment considering both
possibilities is $700(.86) + $750(.14) = $707. Assuming that
the executive has an after-tax opportunity cost of five per-
cent per annum, the after-tax present value of this pay con-
tract at 55 is $707/(1. 05) 10 , or $434.03. So much for the
reward
.
From the company's point of view, it must pay $1000
in 10 years regardless of what happens to the executive.
Since it can then deduct this payment against corporate in-
come, the after-tax value of the asset it is transferring
to the executive is only $520 (assuming the 48 percent tax
rate). The cost, then, is the present value of this asset;
14 This writer is indebted to Mr. I. Lee Atkinson,
District Manager, Southwestern General Life Insurance Company,




assuming an annual 10 percent opportunity cost, it is
$520/(1. 10) 10 , or roughly $200.46. On a per dollar basis,
this cost is roughly $0.46 for each dollar realized by the
executive, that is, $ 200 . 46/ $434 . 03 = $0.46.
By applying the analytical procedure, described above,
for each type of pay alternative, the alternative costs are
illustrated in Exhibit III. Each figure in this exhibit
represents the after-tax, present value cost the company
incurs to provide each grade of executive with an additional
after-tax award of $1.00. For example, it costs the company
$0.7 2 to provide an additional dollar in salary and bonus
to an executive aged 50 who earns $20,000 per year. Alter-
natively, the company could provide the additional dollar
by increasing his pension benefits--this would cost $0,536--
or by granting him a qualified stock option which would cost
$1,071. The pay plans have been ranked by relative cost
efficiency; thus one can identify the plan that entails the
lowest cost per dollar of reward by identifying the plan
with the highest rank within the income class.
In the $20,00 class, "Current Salary and Bonus"
ranks ten, which means that there are nine less costly means
of providing an equivalent reward. The conclusion, then, at
least for this executive, is that current cash renumeration
is a relatively undesirable vehicle for compensation. If
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the economics of the transaction, current salary and bonus
would be used quite infrequently. This, of course, is
clearly not the case in practice. The tradition of salary
and bonus rewards and, more importantly, the employee's
need for some basic level of income on a current, liquid
basis explains the predominance of this type of reward in
existing pay packages. The whole purpose, of course, in
deriving the statistics in Exhibit III was to ascertain,
through a cost-benefit procedure, the attractiveness of the
stock options to both the executive and the corporation as
a result of the 1969 Tax Reform Act. There seems to be
little question that the qualified and restricted stock
options are not a very efficient form of compensation as far
as cost to the company or benefit to the executive are
concerned
.
The drastic change in the taxation of restricted stock
options has produced a 'rather curious result. As noted in
Exhibit III, restricted stock plans, that are taxed when
restrictions lapse, have a highly unstable cost performance
across income levels, jumping from first to nearly last in
the cost rankings. The low cost of these plans for low-
income executives results from the fact that price appreciation
in restricted shares is now taxed as compensation to the
executive and hence is a deductible expense for the company.
15George W. Hettenhouse and Wilbur G. Lewellen, "The
Taxation of Restricted Stock Compensation Plans," National
Tax Journal (September, 1969), p. 367.
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So long as the employee's marginal tax rate is less than the
48 percent corporate tax rate, each dollar in price appreciation
in the restricted shares tends to further reduce the per
dollar cost of reward. ^
Additionally, the cost figures suggest that more
companies will resort to bonuses and nonqualified stock
options in the future for rewarding top executives.
Summary
There were many revisions to management compensation
plans in 1970, and most of the revisions had an important
impact on corporate stock option programs. The major event
which triggered this activity was the 19 69 Tax Reform Act.
While the 1964 Tax Reform Act reduced the attractiveness of
the restricted stock option, the 1969 Act put the finishing
touches on the restricted stock option and dramatically
reduces the attractiveness of the qualified option, at least
to the highly paid executive.
From the individual executive's standpoint, new tax
provisions which apply to earned income, tax-preference in-
come, and capital gains have had a decided impact on the
interest the executive has placed, and will continue to
place, on the attractiveness of the stock option. Generally
speaking, for the executive with earned income in the upper






capital gains, there is no question that, as a result of
the 19 69 Tax Reform Act, he will be paying much higher taxes
than he would have under the old tax laws. The "Executive
Jones" illustration conclusively proved this point.
The Act virtually "killed off" the restricted stock
option. Under the provisions of the Act, the executive
must decide, within 30 days, whether to pay taxes on the
market value of the stock at the time the option was exercised
or at the time the restrictions lapse. This is a very
difficult decision, and one which few executives care to
make, since no one knows whether the stock will appreciate
or decline by the time the restrictions lapse. If the stock
appreciates, it is to the executive's benefit to pay the
taxes now. If the stock should decrease in market value,
it would, of course, be to the executive's benefit to pay
the tax at the time the restrictions lapse.
Stock options, as a result of the 19 69 Tax Reform
Act, are quite inefficient as a monetary compensation device.
The executive and corporate management can readily see,
based on developed alternative costs, that stock options rank
very low in relative cost efficiency when compared with
other elements of compensation. This ranking is the result
of a cost-benefit analysis— finding the after-tax, present
value cost to the company of providing a given after-tax,
present value benefit to the executive.

CHAPTER III
THE STOCK OPTION AS AN ENTREPRENEURIAL INCENTIVE
No one is likely to suggest that the U. S. Congress
would deliberately set about to eliminate one of the most
powerful entrepreneurial incentives ever created: the stock
option. Yet, by passing the Tax Reform Acts of 1964 and
1969, Congress substantially reduced the profit potential
of options and thus, in effect, crippled what has claimed
to be one of the principal motors of industrial growth in
this country. Possibly Congress reacted primarily to man-
agement's abuse of stock options in the years immediately
following the legalization of restricted stock options in
1950. Had they taken the time to consider the effectiveness
in historical perspective, their action might have been
different
.
Although the effects of these tax laws are now be-
ginning to become evident, the stock option's loss of
power as a long-term incentive does not appear to be
widely recognized ... a fact backed up by the number
of companies that renewed old stock option plans in the
opening months of 1970 as though nothing important had
happened .
^
1Erwin N. Griswold, "Are Stock Options Getting Out of
Hand?" Harvard Business Review (November-December, 1960),
p. 55
.






While there is certainly room for debate as to whether
or not the widespread use of stock options contributed to
the expansion of U. S. industry after 19 50, the fact remains
that industry did expand prodigiously over the last two
decades. In the three years prior to the passage of stock
option legislation (a period, incidentally, of post-war
recovery, not of recession), the gross national product rose
an average of 3.3 percent annually. Each three-year period
since 1950, except for the recession period around 1958, has
surpassed the pre-option level. Furthermore, the rate of
gain has increased with the passage of time, perhaps because
time improved both the administration of options and man-
agement's recognition of their incentive value.
As companies became increasingly sophisticated in
using options, the entrepreneurial incentive value
of this compensation device increased. Indeed, it
appears that Congress undercut stock options just as
the usage of this complicated incentive tool was
reaching full flower.
Obviously, not every recipient of a stock option grant
immediately becomes a zealous entrepreneur, making ever-
increasing profits for his employer. It could be that few
executives are sufficiently motivated by options to signi-
ficantly change the profit fortunes of their respective
3Paul A. Samuelson, Economics (New York, McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc., 1967), p. 184
4J. E. Wilson, "Let's Integrate Executive Compensation,"
Personnel Journal (August, 1970), p. 673.
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companies. However, these few may have added significantly
to the expansion of industry by providing the leadership
for less motivated executives.
A practical affirmation of the stock option's con-
tribution to the nation's economy is presented by a group of
companies located near Boston.
Those familiar with the development of this microcosm
along the 'miracle miles' of Route 128 are convinced
that the incentive which made executive staffing of
these new companies possible was the stock option, for
salaries were deliberately kept low to minimize costs.
Perhaps coincidentally , the electronics and R 8 D
companies started their hegira to the newly constructed
Route 128 in 1951, the very year after the restricted
stock option was legalized. The executive and research
talent required to expand this limited base was attracted
by the capital gains lure of restricted stock options.
Although it is clear that man> of the 800-odd companies
strung along Route 128 today were relatively well-
established when they arrived, many of the 70,000 emp-
loyees in this complex came to their jobs because of
the availability of stock options at a very critical
juncture in their company's history. This includes
many executives and researcher's who left a big company
or university to accept the low starting salary and
risks of a fledgling enterprise.
No one, of course, can determine how much our country
stands to lose as a result of the new businesses that are
not born because of changes wrought in the industrial en-
vironment by the Tax Reform Acts. But every major industrial
city— Los Angeles, Cleveland, Chicago, to name a few--is
surrounded by its equivalent of the Route 128 community.
°" Incentives : Jam Tomorrow," Economist (March 15,
1969), pp. 69-70.




In hindsight, it is clear that the 1964 Tax Reform
Act, by raising the holding period for capital gains treat-
ment to three years and by reducing the option life span
from ten to five years, partially destroyed the stock option
as a major incentive. However, no one realized this fact
because the "devastating portent of the 19 64 tax act was
concealed ... by the continued rise in stock prices during
the late 1960 T s. This perhaps helps to explain the generally




Senior executives, who had profited handsomely from
their earlier options, felt it only fair, when old plans ex-
pired, to offer the new qualified options to oncoming younger
executives. The latter, in turn, accepted the options in




In 1969, just when the five-year option period of
early qualified plans was expiring and options had to be
exercised, the stock market slumped badly. The full disaster
brought about by the 19 64 Tax Reform Act was exposed by this
collapse. Executives who had purchased optioned shares with
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interest suddenly found it necessary to sell-out to protect
their loans. To illustrate: One senior executive exercised
a 3,000 share option in late 1968, when his company's shares
were selling at $110. Since his option price was $52, he
borrowed approximately $156,0 00 to buy the stock. His pro-
tective margin of "paper" profit by this time was $174,0 00.
By early fall of 19 69, however, the stock price had slumped
to $63 and his margin of safety had fallen to $33,000. He
then faced the agonizing decision of whether to sell or hold
By selling he would protect his loan but lose a capital
gains opportunity and a certain amount of "face" with his
fellow officers. Fortunately, he did sell, and made a
modest profit, on which he paid an ordinary income tax, for
the stock has since dropped below $50.
It has been estimated that perhaps half of all exec-
utives who exercised options in the late 19 60 's were forced
by declining prices to 'sell their stock in self protection.
Many more hold options priced substantially above today's
market, and the first-in-first-out provision of the 1964 Act
has them trapped. In other words, they cannot exercise a
later, lower priced option until they have exercised the
earlier, higher priced one. Thus, even before the 1969 Tax
Reform Act, the incentive value of options was seriously







of the qualified options permitted by the 19 64 law.
Further Fetters
The 1969 Tax Reform Act actually did not deal directly
with stock options. However, the entrepreneurial incentive
value of options was indirectly undermined by two aspects
of the new act
:
(a) the increase in the tax on capital gains, whereby
only the first $50,00 of gains is now eligible for
the 25 percent alternative tax.
(b) the provision which stipulates that one element
in the executive's compensation package must be eval-
uated in terms of its impact on another element of
his -total pay.
This latter is something new in this kind of legis-
lation. It provides that an individual's earned income (that
part of his income eligible for the new 5 percent maximum
tax) may be affected by the tax preference income he reports,
which includes stock option gains at date of exercise plus
one-half of all capital gains. This tax preference income
may also be subject to a new "minimum tax" of ten percent.
Thus, the Tax Act's impact on stock option gains requires
an assessment of provisions involving the minimum tax, the
maximum tax, and the alternative tax on capital gains.
This new interdependence of one element on another in
the total compensation package tends to confuse each element's
individual incentive value. For example, discounting capital
10Arch Patton, "Thinking Ahead," Harvard Business Re -
view (September-October, 1970), p. 25.
11Arch Patton, "Executive Compensation Inequities,"
Business Horizons (April, 1970), p. 76.
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gains on stock options by 25 percent no longer gives the
executive an accurate measure of his profit, since complex
tax considerations have now been injected where none existed
before. In such a situation, the short-term incentive, re-
presenting the "bird-in-hand," tends to erode the value of
the longer-term incentive.
The 1969 Tax Reform Act also gave short-term incen-
tives another big boost by establishing the 50 percent
maximum individual tax rate starting in 197 2. "When fully
operative, this provision will be equivalent to a $10,000
1
2
raise for the executive with $150,000 in net taxable income." '
The spendable income yielded by this change in the maximum
tax rate has the effect of downgrading all kinds of deferred
income, including capital gains that may result from stock
option profits in the future.
Increasing Disillusion
The net effect of the last two tax acts and the stock
market slump in 1969 and 1970, is a severe reduction in the
incentive value of options. The more sophisticated executive
has become aware that the three-year holding period of the
1964 Act and the constraints of the 1969 Act, make capital
gains profits from options less attractive. Consider the
following case as offered by Arch Patton:
12
"Executive Pay to Climb Faster in Next Five Years,"
Industrial Week (May 11, 19 70), p. 24.

The president of a consumer goods company recently
went shopping for two highly entrepreneurial top exec-
utives. He was in an unusually good position to attract
men of this temperament, for he had founded his own
company and built it to annual sales of nearly $100
million in less than a decade. Further, he was the
dominant stockholder and willing to pay whatever it took
to get the right men.
The two candidates he settled on were senior exec-
utives in competitor companies with sales in excess of
$1 billion. Both men received cash compensation of
more than $100,000, well above what the same jobs in
the president's relatively small company were valued
at in the marketplace. But he felt that these men
would be worth any reasonable premium, and agreed to
meet their cash income needs. The two candidates also
had sizable stock options in their companies, and here
the president believed he had a big advantage. Their
very large companies were growing at industry's 6%
rate, while his company was surging ahead at better
than 3 5% compounded . . . and probably would continue
this growth rate for several n ore years.
Despite a stock option offer worth more than $1 million
for each future doubling of tie company's stock price,
both men decided against accepting the job offer.
Indeed, the president agreed to double the size of
these already generous options when he sensed this
reluctance to join his company . . . without success.
These apparently highly motivated men simply did not
believe that stock ' options would pay off for them, even
if the stock price doubled or trebled. Capital gains
potential of stock options, the classical entrepre-
neurial incentive of recent years, did not provide
adequate motivation for these two executives to change
jobs . ^-3
Not all executives, however, have become disillusioned
with stock options. The younger executive, particularly one
who has not had an option, still finds them attractive. But
his interest primarily reflects his lack of experience with
and knowledge of the changes which have resulted from the
13Arch Patton, "Thinking Ahead," Harvard Business Re -
v i ew
, p . 2 7.
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19 64 and 19 69 Tax Reform Acts. Furthermore, the younger,
middle-management executive typically regards stock options
as a secondary incentive. His primary interest is current
income. Thus it is fair to say that the option has not
lost its secondary value as an incentive, just its primary
entrepreneurial value.
Only the very highly paid top executives make the
important entrepreneurial decisions, and options have been
an important motivator to those executives where stock option
plans were in effect. But now, it appears, as a result of
the 19 64 and 19 69 Tax Reform Acts, that industry must build
its executive incentive program around short-term company
profits. "The one truly long-term profit incentive was the
stock option," and the message from Congress on this entre-
preneurial incentive comes through loud and clear to all
but the youngest executives.
The implications of the short-term profit focus of
executive incentives are ominous for the individual company
and for the economy as a whole. Based on this writer's
knowledge of incentives, it is his belief that individual
incentives must directly reflect the corporate interest.
Yet when incentives are keyed almost exclusively to short-
term profits, it becomes relatively easy for executive
1L
*H. Spencer, "How Share Incentive Schemes are Working




interests and corporate interests to differ. Corporate
concern with building tomorrow's profits tends to increase
current costs and to reduce today's profits. Since exec-
utive incentives are now largely based on current profits,
there is reduced motivation to build for the future. For
example:
Suppose a company is having a good year, but the
following year is expected to be a poor one. It is not
difficult under such conditions to add profit to the current
year by shifting costs to the following year. This would
have the effect of permitting bonus increases in year one
without reducing compensation in year two, when no bonuses
would be paid anyhow. In other words, executive interests
would differ from corporate interests, and the short-term
reward focus would offer management an incentive to make
decisions that are detrimental to the company.
Rationale for Change
It is strongly suspected by this writer, that unless
Congress reinstates some form of entrepreneurial incentive,
with a focus on the long-term profitability of enterprise,
the 1970 T s are likely to go down in history as a dismal
decade in terms of the growth rate. Some might take issue
with this view, claiming that the nonqualified option pro-
vides adequate motivation for the long term, but despite the
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fact that this type of option is offered by any number of
companies, it does not fill the entrepreneurial need. Con-
sider: Any profit is treated as current income by the in-
dividual recipient, and the cost is a deductible expense
to the corporation on exercise-. This tends to influence
the short-term view. To the extent that individuals sell
stock at exercise to pay taxes, the nonqualified option is
unlikely to build substantial executive stock ownership in
an enterprise.
To date, few, if any, entrepreneurial incentives
have even approached the effectiveness of the 19 50 restricted
stock option as a financial inducement for executives to
build long-term company profits. What can be done about this
situation? Obviously, it will ta>e legislative concern
and action.
Naturally, every nuance of a stock option program
cannot be legislated.
The option is a unique entrepreneurial incentive with
a long 'learning curve' as far as effective adminis-
tration is concerned. And for better or for worse,
the skill with which management administers an option
plan is a critical factor in its effectiveness. b
That cannot be legislated.
The 1969 Tax Reform Act's phased reduction in the max-
imum rate on earned income will help restore the loss of
after-tax income suffered by top management during the past
16Robert V. Sedwick, "Trends in Top Management Compen-
sation," Personnel (American Management Association, July-
August, 1968), pp. 48-49.
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two decades. (The policy-level executive's share of total
corporate payroll, for example, dropped 2 5 percent between
1945 and 1968 according to a McKinsey and Company survey
1 7
of 86 large companies.) However, the net effect of the
Act's tax treatment represents little more than an "overkill,"
since the 19 64 Act and the subsequent stock market slump
have left, it would seem, just an afterglow of the option's
previous incentive value.
It is interesting to note that the economic boom of
the 1950 's and 1960 ' s paralleled the life span of the re-
stricted stock option. If, as this writer strongly suspects,
Congress made a mistake in killing off stock options as an
effective incentive for building new companies, steps should
be taken to rectify this error before the 1970 's are too far
along. Ta< reform has seriously undermined the profit po-
tential of stock options and thus (assuming they are primarily
motivated by monetary returns) executives are less likely to
work in the long-range interests of their companies.
Summary
By passing the Tax Reform Acts of 1964 and 1969, Con-
gress has reduced profit potential of stock options and
therefore may have established obstacles to industrial growth
in the United States. The tax provisions of the two Acts
may well have had a detrimental effect on top management's
17 P. H. Durston, "Uproar Over Options," Duns Review
(December, 1969), p. 40.
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long-term business outlook. The effect of the 1964 Act was
not readily apparent until the stock market began to decline
significantly in 1969. The 19 64 requirements to hold options
for three years and reduce the option life span to five years
were important factors in destroying the option's entre-
preneurial incentive. These restrictions, coupled with the
1969 Act's increase in tax on capital gains and the provision
on evaluating each pay element in terms of its impact on an
executive's total pay, created short-term incentives and
short-term profitability objectives. Because executive
incentives are now largely based on current profits, there
could follow less motivation to build for the future.

CHAPTER IV
CREATING A NEW DEMAND
The 19 69 Tax Reform Act, a bear market on Wall Street
and galloping inflation have thrown corporations into a
turmoil over how to pay their top executives
,
particularly
those who are paid above $52,0 00 per year. "There may not
be many of them, but they have a lot of muscle, and com-
panies feel it when they sneeze."
Reform
As consultants , lawyers , and accountants dream up new
strategies, virtually every large company has been forced to
take a hard look at its compensation program.- The results
of these reviews are beginning to take shape.
1. Cash and bonuses are becoming more attractive,
while deferred compensation plans grow increasingly risky.
2. Corporations are not scrapping stock option plans,
but they are supplementing them with such devices as non-
qualified options, phantom stock programs, and tandem stock
options. Even stock option swapping is taking place in a
few companies.
"A Confusing Payday for Men at the Top," Business




3. A few consultants are pushing flexible "smorgas-
borg" or "Cafeteria" compensation packages, which allow
executives to choose how they will be paid.
Nineteen sixty-nine and 1970 have been years of great
change in management compensation . . . there have been
more revisions of management compensation programs in
the past 12 months than any other recent year. About
half of the nation's companies have made changes in
their stock pay programs. 2
Not surprisingly, the whole business of options is now
coming under careful scrutiny. Already, of course, they
have changed a good deal over the years. As discussed prev-
iously, up to 1964, the big stock option was the restricted
type. When Congress cracked down on restricted options,
they were succeeded by qualified options. Today, the qual-
ified option is still popular, but losing its appeal.
The transition periods
The stock option had its heyday in the 19 50's and
early 19 60's when the top personal tax rate was as high as
91 percent. But, when a highly paid executive sold stock
he acquired through options, he paid no more than 2 5 percent
on the gain.
In 19 64, the top tax was cut to 70 percent, and the
rules of the game were also changed. Options had to be
exercised within five years rather than ten, as before.
2Robert E. Sibson, "Executive Pay: A Time of Dramatic
Change," Nation's Business (November, 1970), p. 89.
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More importantly , once options were exercised, the executive
was required to hold on to them for three more years to get
the lower capital gains tax rate. Previously, the minimum
holding period had been six months. The changes made options
increasingly difficult and costly to finance.
The 1969 Tax Reform Act really administered the coup
de grace to the qualified stock option. Beginning in 197 2,
earned income such as salary will be taxed at no more than
50 percent, while the capital gains rate on such items as
option gains moves up to 3 5 percent. And, the executive
also may have to pay an additional ten percent minimum tax
on a portion of extremely large preference income items . . .
which include one-half of long-term capital gains as well as
any paper gain on the difference between an option's exercise
price and the stock's market value.
The experiences of Litton Industries provide a good
example of the effect that the stock market can now have on
a qualified stock option plan. As recently as early 1967,
top executives at Litton Industries were delighted about the
250,000 shares that stockholders had just voted to set aside
for them under a qualified option plan. It was not sur-
prising, for by then every share of Litton, even after a
2 for 1 split, was worth $117, and the bull market seemed
to be gathering strength. But all did not end well for the
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happy executives. The Litton plan called for a waiting
period of a year before the options could be granted, which
is not an unusual restriction. This brought its executives
to the threshold of 19 68. Even with the price down from
the previous years peak to the 80 T s, 7 0's and 60' s, no one
took the drop for more than an aberration. Considering
that shares bought under option must be paid for at the full
market price the day the award is granted, the stocks had,
in fact, a special new attractiveness.
There was one big problem however: Litton had thought-
fully provided an installment plan to go with its options.
Instead of having to dip into reserves or borrow money to
buy the stocks with a lump sum payment, Litton executives
were allowed to pay for them in ecual amounts over a five
year period, always, however, at the price of the original
grant. By the end of 1970, Litton stock had slid all the
way to 15 1/2 per share which is certainly alarming to
executives whose options provided a "bargain" price of $66
to $85 a share. 3
Even with the difficulties experienced by Litton
Industries, options are still far from dead; they are just
being overhauled to make them more effective in the light
of current market and tax conditions. In January, 19 71,
McKinsey and Company released a new study which sampled
3




16 5 large companies in a wide mix of industries. The survey
showed that qualified options are definitely losing ground
as the most popular means for extra compensation.
While 6 5 percent of the companies with option plans
were giving qualified options in January, 197 0, that
figure dropped to 58 percent by year end. But more
significantly, when companies get around to the
changes they say they are working on, the percentage
of qualified option plans could fall to as low as 38
percent in the near future . . . maybe as early as
next year.^
What is happening is that companies are putting in
more flexible, diversified compensation plans such as tan-
dem options and phantom stock. The use of tandem option
plans , a combination of both qualified and nonqualified
options, more than doubled in 1970 and soon, as Exhibit IV
shows, may account for about one-third of the special plans.
Similarly, the use of phantom stock, which is essentially
a fancy way of giving a deferred tonus, grew by more than
100 percent in 19 70 and is expected to double again.
In January, 1971, another new study by Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell and Company, using the latest proxies from 67 6 of
the largest companies on the New York Stock Exchange, shows
that almost 80 percent have now put in some kind of option
plan, versus 74 percent a year ago. The study also confirms
that executives were in a hurry to exercise options before
the new tax law took effect. Managers exercised options equal
"Top Men Demand New Kinds of Pay," Business Week
(January 23, 1971), p. 65.
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to 8 8.6 percent of their direct pay, as compared with only
67.4 percent a year earlier.
EXHIBIT IV


















Data: McKinsey and Co.
Demand for new compensation elements
But the main point is that vast new complexities have
been introduced since the various compensation items are now
interrelated in terms of tax effects. An executive's first
reaction, it would seem, is to throw up his hands and to
demand "cash now." As a result, some companies hire outside
experts to help their executives sort out the problem areas.
'Business Week, p. 66
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And other companies are setting up tax-sheltered investments,
such as apartment complexes and other real estate ventures,
c
in which they let top management participate.
Nonqualified stock options . --At the heart of the search for
new compensation schemes, to combat the provisions of the
1969 Tax Reform Act, is a surge of interest in the nonqual-
ified stock option. It differs from the qualified stock
option in that the exercise period is not limited to five
years and there is no three-year holding requirement, making
it less costly to finance. The nonqualified option can also
be issued at less than market price. Any paper gain between
the market and the exercise price is taxed at the 50 percer.t
"earned income" maximum upon exercise, while the company
gets a deduction for the same amount as a salary expense.
Charles Peck, analyst for the American Management Association,
said; "A good flexible arrangement, maybe with a provision
for installment buying, is what a lot of companies need, and
7
adding the nonqualified option is one way to get it."
Tandem stock plans . --While a few companies have gone to non-
qualified options, more interest is in the new tandem plans
that combine both qualified and nonqualified options. Tandem
options are being used in two ways. Under one scheme, the





, p . 40.
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options to executives as they see fit. Other plans grant
executives both kinds, and let the manager choose which he
will exercise. McKinsey and Company contends that tandem
plans provide "a hedge against still more tax law changes in
the future, as well as flexibility for individual executive
needs . "
°
Phantom stock plans . Late in the Spring of 1970, Inter-
national Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) unwrapped a new com-
pensation package for its executives. In line with the
trend, the ITT plan includes both qualified and nonqualified
stock options. Of even greater interest though, it offered
for the first time, a third incentive that the company care-
fully labels a "performance stock unit plan." But, by this
or any other name, what ITT is actually giving its top
executives is one of the most versatile, if least known,
of all corporate motivators: phantom stock.
Phantom stock could enjoy a tremendous surge in popu-
larity in the wake of the 19 6 9 Tax Reform Act. Phantom stock
does not qualify for capital-gains treatment, which is probably
the main reason it has remained obscure. But the new law
makes capital-gains income much less appealing than it was
under the old law. As the name implies, phantom stock awards





9John C. Perham, "Phantom Stock: Better than Options,"
Duns Review (September, 1970), p. 33.
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the executive with a number of stock "units," which rise or
fall in value as the company's stock rises or falls in the
market. Under some phantom plans the full value of the
fictitious stock is eventually distributed to the executive,
while under others only the amount of any gain in market
value is paid out. Either way, the executive can profit
from the performance of his company's stock without risking
any of his own capital. The phantom plan also provides an
advantage to the company, since any distributions are tax-
deductible; qualified options, by contrast, do not provide
tax deductions for the company.
Phantom stock plans, though little publicized, are
not really new. They have been around for over 15 years,
and among the long-time users are du Pont, General Motors,
Union Carbide, Koppers , Bethlehem Steel and Eastman Kodak.
In its simplest form, the executive is awarded units
equal to a certain number of imaginary shares of company
stock and receives every year a sum equal to the dividends on
these shares. The payments are usually accumulated in the
executive's account until he retires, although a number of
the companies pay out the cash each year. Thus, while the
market fluctuations of the company's stock can affect the
executive's overall compensation, he is assured of a healthy
10Arthur M. Louis, "Hidden Jokers in the New Tax Deck,"
Fortune (July, 1970), p. 112.
-*-•*-Duns Review, p. 33.
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payoff year after year regardless of market performance,
just as long as the company keeps paying out dividends.
Stockholders tend to be highly critical about stock option
awards, not to mention six-figure salaries and bonuses,
particularly when they are upset over market losses and
falling earnings. But, they are less likely to complain
about compensation based on dividends, a benefit they also
receive and would themselves like to see get bigger each
year.
The cumulative effect of phantom stock can really
become impressive. Not only does the executive collect
the dividends on his units everytime the company makes a
payout, he can also be awarded new units year after year.
As units are added to units , and dividend payouts to div-
idend payouts, the executive's account can build up spec-
tacularly.
The real beauty of phantom plans for the executive is
that he is not required to risk a cent of his own money and
so never has to worry about financing. Compare this with
the plight of the executive with stock options caught in a
tight-money, bear-market situation.
Any payments made from the account of the executive
are taxable in the year they are received. The executive
has the option of deferring payment, and therefore his
12john c. Perham, Duns Review, p. 33.
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taxes , for as long as fifteen years , but that would almost
certainly make his compensation ineligible for the 50 percent
maximum tax rate applied to earned income.
Indeed, there is some disagreement among tax experts as
to what, if any, phantom-stock income can be considered
earned income. The Treasury Department has not ruled
on this matter. -^-^
While considerable space has been devoted to phantom
stock plans, this writer feels that this type of plan will,
if any plan at all can, replace the stock option as the
prime long-term incentive; and this has only come about by
federal tax legislation and its impact on stock options.
The future of phantom stock plans is, admittedly, uncertain
since Congress may decide to tightsn up on all forms of
deferred compensation. The fact remains, however, that it
did pass through the 1969 Tax Reform Act unscathed.
Swapping stock options .--Amid all the turmoil and disappoint-
ment that surrounded the bull-market options in the bear
market at the close of 1970, and the announcement of the
disappointing effects of the 1969 Tax Reform Act on stock
options, companies have been trying to figure a way to make
options more attractive. New gimmicks have been established
and one of the more interesting is the option swap. In
essence the company is telling their executives to turn in








equal number of new ones, priced to fit the collapsed market.
The idea sounds attractive. The company relieves the partic-
ipant of his tarnished right to buy stock at bull market
prices and awards him a new option adjusted to the bear
market. "In this way management hopes to kindle enthusiasm
for one of its favorite tools for rewarding executives and
keeping them happy in their jobs."
There is a hitch, however, for no company can blithely
call in old options just because they appear to be worthless,
declare them null and void and replace them. In other words,
these new options are not exercisable until such time as
the surrendered options would have expired. The Internal
Revenue Service considers them still in effect until their
scheduled expiration which is five years from the date of
issue for qualified options.
The executive who accepts the proposed swap receives
a piece of paper that has no value until his options run out.
It does provide him with a timely psychological lift, by
letting him know that management is attempting, within the
framework of the law, to do all they can to make the options
worthwhile as a means of compensation.
In one variant or another, announcement of option
swaps have recently come from Fairchild Camera and Instrument






from the Questor Corporation; and from Sears, Roebuck-
controlled De Soto, Incorporated (a maker of paint and
coatings). ° Gulf Resources appears further along in the
swapping process than some of the other companies. In their
1970 proxy statement, "A total of 48 optionees surrendered
178,650 options exercisable at an average per share option
price of $23.60 for new options covering 178,650 shares
1 7
exercisable at $9,125 per share."
From management's viewpoint, swapping options does
have an advantage since it can take options out of circulation.
So, as it grants new options, it can take an equal number
out of circulation, thus keeping the total number of shares
outstanding within limits approved by the stockholders.
The option swap is better tnan nothing, but its
advantages to the participant are limited. What he really
receives is an eventual claim on the stock at today's prices.
Thus , he is gambling that over the next few years the stock
market will go up. The point comes to mind, however, that




Stock options are far from dead, but recent tax legis-




1 J. E. Wilson, "Let's Integrate Executive Compen-
sation," Personnel Journal (August, 1970), p. 673.
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best way to pay their top executives. Stock option plans
are particularly receiving wide attention because most of
the provisions of the 1969 Tax Reform Act are considered to
be unfavorable to the heavily compensated top executive.
Other new elements of compensation are probably receiving
equal attention, if not more.
There is little question that stock options are losing
their appeal as far as the executive is concerned. If the
executive loses interest, then the corporation must do some-
thing to assure the recapture of his interest and confidence.
How can stock options or closely related compensation elements
be made more attractive? Corporations are devising alter-
native measures which will provide, within the limitations
of the law , a motivational impact on the executive. Non-
qualified stock option plans, tandem stock option plans,
phantom st^ck plans, and option swapping are some of the
remedies. The most appealing appears to be the phantom stock
plan, for it offers a higher degree of long-term incentive




Every field of endeavor has its prophets and the field
of executive compensation is no exception. This is especially
true whenever major tax legislation changes occur. Corporate
management and the individual executive certainly do their
share of prophesying, and with recent tax legislation changes,
the "executive suite" is pondering the alternatives of exec-
utive compensation today.
Stock options can be eminently successful and extremsly
efficient in rewarding the highly compensated executive, pro-
vided they are blessed with favorable tax considerations.
They can make possible levels of compensation otherwise un-
attainable under the personal income tax structure. This is
not, however, universally true. Stock options in the early
19 60's, for example, had advantages for the executive whose
annual salary was approximately $75,000. Below that level,
where a great number of options existed, it was generally
true that a simple increase in salary would have been of
greater benefit not only to the executive but also to the





The stock option received its official Congressional
sanction via the 1950 Revenue Act. This legislation was to
have a decided impact on executive compensation for the next
twenty years, for it created the restricted stock option,
one of the most powerful top executive motivators industry
has ever known. The reason for restricted stock option
success was that through the 19 50 Revenue Act, executives
were granted long-term capital gains tax advantages , the
result of which, was an almost overnight boom in the use of
corporate stock option plans. The 19 50 Revenue Act, in
effect, liberalized the treatment of stock options and made
them much more attractive as a means of compensation. The
19 54 Revenue Act further refined the provisions of the 19 50
Revenue Act, by providing ground rules for the timing of and
limitatior.s for reporting of capital gains.
The restricted stock option flourished during the
1950 's and 1960's as evidenced by various surveys conducted
by such notable consulting firms as McKinsey and Company and
Robert E. Sibson and Company. These firms, along with the
National Industrial Conference Board, provided sufficient
statistical information to validate the widespread use of the
stock option. Approximately two-thirds of all companies
listed on the New York Stock Exchange during the 19 50's and
early 19 60's is a good indication of the attractiveness of
the stock option. The manufacturing and retail trade industries
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utilized the stock option as an executive motivator to the
greatest extent. Within industries, regardless of type,
most option programs were found in the high annual revenue
companies. Stock option gains were particularly impressive,
sometimes amounting to five times an executive's annual base
salary and bonuses.
It may appear that with the passing of the 19 50 Revenue
Act that all companies and all executives were proponents of
stock option programs, but this was not true. There were
many opponents from the private and public sectors who nor-
mally based their objections on, what they considered to be,
unreasonable tax preferential treatment afforded stock options.
Although formal objections were registered in federal courts,
they were almost uniformly unsuccessful. Congress maintained
its position that there was a need for tax relief for the top
executive who was willing to risk capital, career, and repu-
tation for the enterprise. Thus, tax advantages augment the
profitability of stock options. Moreover, there would have
been no extensive executive interest in corporate adoption of
stock plans in the 19 50's if there had not been accompanying
tax advantages. Tax legislation in 1950 gave stock options
their greatest impetus, and in the process, made many an
executive a wealthy man.
After 19 50, tax legislation had little impact on exec-
utive and corporate interest in stock options until the mid -I960'
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Nineteen-sixty-four heralded the 1964 Tax Reform Act. This
Act had a significant influence on the types of stock options
adopted, but not on the prevalence of stock option programs.
The 19 64 Tax Reform Act took much of the steam out of re-
stricted stock options and provided a framework for structuring
the qualified stock option plan. The legislation had the
effect of "freezing" the further use of restricted stock
options and substituting qualified options in their place.
The main provisions affecting stock options were the
requirements that options be exercised in five years in lieu
of 10 years (as with the restricted stock option) and shares
must be held for three years, (instead of six months) before
they could be sold. Although these were not the only pro-
visions, they did have a decided impact on the fall of the
restricted stock option. The net result was a complete turn
around, with almost three out of four option plans being of
the qualified type.
Without a doubt, the 1969 Tax Reform Act has had a
greater impact on executive compensation, and particularly
stock option plans than any tax legislation since 19 50. The
effects have been dramatic, not only to the executive, but
also to the corporation. It has virtually eliminated the
further development of the restricted stock option. The
corporation is presently in a real quandary in its attempt
to develop a compensation package which will be attractive
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to the executive while maintaining the lowest possible costs
for each element of the package. The new tax provisions
have a decided effect on each element of the compensation
package since they specifically apply to earned income, tax-
preference income and capital gains
.
There is little question that the top executive exer-
cising stock options today finds himself in a less favorable
tax position as a result of the 1969 Tax Reform Act. By
actual tax calculations for a hypothetical executive (Exec-
utive Jones) in Chapter II, under reasonable income circum-
stances, this point was illustrated. Many executives have
found the advantages of capital gains too small to make extra
risks worthwhile. While a complete discussion of the pro-
visions of the Act was presented in Chapter II, it is signif-
icant to note that beginning in 197 2, the capital gains
rate will go up to 35 percent for gains of more than $50,000,
as opposed to the 25 percent tax on all capital gains under
the old law. This increase, plus the provision of reporting
paper gains between the option price and the market price as
tax-preference income for the three years prior to the top
executive's eligibility to sell the stock, make the qualified
option a less desirable element in the compensation package.
Through utilization of a cost-benefit procedure, it
was possible to rank the various stock options, based on the
after-tax, present value cost to the company of providing
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a given after-tax, present value benefit to the executive.
A visual check of the alternative costs developed in Exhibit
III, Chapter II, clearly shows that by using the provisions
of the 1969 Tax Reform Act, the qualified and restricted
stock options are relatively inefficient in a monetary sense.
It would appear that stock options , under the present tax
structure, have little right to be included in the compen-
sation package.
Chapter III covered the impact of the 1964 and 1969
Tax Reform Acts on the entrepreneurial incentive value of
stock options. There is little doubt that Congressional
endorsement of the 1964 and 1969 tax legislation reduced the
attractiveness of the stock option and therefore crippled
one of the most influential factors in long-range industrial
growth. lax reform has seriously undermined the profit
potential of stock options and thus executives are less likely
to work in the long-term interests of their companies. How
much this country stands to lose as a result of the new
enterprises not born can not be determined, but the two
Acts have taken their toll.
The effect of the 1964 Tax Reform Act was not readily
apparent until 1969, when the stock market plummeted. The
Act,, by raising the holding period for capital gains to three
years and reducing the option life to five years, contributed
to the decline of the stock option as a major incentive.
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This fact was not generally recognized because the stock
market prices rose appreciably during the late 1960's,
over-shadowing the deleterious effects of the tax reform.
However, in 19 69, it became all too clear when many exec-
utives had to sell their options to cover high interest
payments on loans originally made to buy the options
.
Corporations are not scrapping stock options as a
result of the 1969 Tax Reform Act, but they are definitely
looking to new avenues for executive compensation. The stock
options have lost sufficient appeal to the top executive
that corporate management must be able to provide suitable,
substitute inducements. During 1970, at least four new pro-
grams have received wide attention; nonqualified stock options,
tandem stock options, phantom stock, and option swapping.
While option swapping is not widespread in industry, the
other three have gained momentum at the expense of the
qualified option. The problem is to develop that formula
of executive compensation which will provide the executive
with a hedge against the provisions of the 1969 Tax Reform
Act.
How has federal tax legislation influenced corporate
and executive interest in stock options during the period
19 50-197 0? The impact of tax legislation on corporate and
executive stock option plans during the past 20 years has
been extensive. Tax legislation provided the major impetus
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for the creation of the restricted stock option in 1950,
let restricted option plans flourish for about 13 years and
then provisions of the 1964 Tax Reform Act reduced restricted
stock option plan desirability for the executive. As a
result, corporations shifted to the qualified stock option
in order to provide executives with the incentive to meet
their own individual needs as well as the entrepreneurial
needs of the firm. The qualified stock option remained as
a powerful form of supplemental compensation until enactment
of the 19 69 Tax Reform Act. The provisions of this Act
again set corporations to the task of finding new ways to
maintain executive interest in stock options, having realized
that the executive, by maintaining his present stock option
program, was subject to higher taxation than he formerly
was. Thus, from 1950 to 1970, the corporation continually
sought that entrepreneurial incentive that would stimulate
the executive to work in the best interests of the firm,
while attempting to develop new stock option programs for
the executive which were of greatest personal benefit to
him in terms of the effect of tax legislation changes. The
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